The current domestic narrative of a United States in decline and in trouble creates a Pygmalion effect which has seen the US slowly draw back on its role as the global hegemon. Stability in the current system needs the US to find the self-confidence to step up once again.
The regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific continues to be shaped by a sharpening of the great power rivalry between the US and China. Concurrently, a concerning trend being witnessed the region is the erosion of the prevailing liberal international order.
This is partly attributed to America’s waning commitment to this existing rules-based order. Since 2017, officials from both the Trump and Biden administrations have highlighted how the existing norms and practises of the international order have begun to work against American interests at home and abroad.
This diminishing American commitment to the tents of the rules-based order is partially derived from a perception among US policymakers that American primacy in the prevailing global order is weakening as competition with countries like China intensifies. As one scholar observes, this narrative stems from the notion that the US is slowly ‘losing its commanding position in the global distribution of power’. In effect, Washington attributes this weakening of American primacy to the prevailing liberal international order which, in Washington’s view, no longer promotes US interests nor guarantees the maintenance of American primacy. Indeed, strategic competition with China is, to some extent, being driven by this belief that the US’s supremacy in the global order must be maintained and safeguarded.
American aversion to the global order as well as the norms and institutions underpinning it have manifested in several ways since 2017. Since President Trump adopted the ‘America First’ foreign policy, there has been a renewed emphasis on economic nationalism and protectionism. President Trump withdrew from multilateral arrangements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and multilateral organisations like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) were hamstrung since the Trump administration blocked the appointment of judges to the dispute resolution Appellate Body.
The Biden administration has continued with many of these policies. Under President Biden, the US has embraced economic mercantilism and introduced ‘industrial policies’ to restrict imports and encourage domestic manufacturing in several sectors. In 2023, President Biden’s National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan stated that “much of the international economic policy of the last few decades” such as globalisation and liberalisation had weakened American industry by moving manufacturing outside the US and negatively impacting America’s industrial base.
Notably, opposition to free trade and multilateral free trade agreements like the TPP have continued under the Biden administration. Although President Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), market access provisions have not been included in IPEF so far. On the contrary, the US today has the highest tariffs since the 1930s.
To be clear, the US not only benefitted from this post-war liberal international order but was also a ‘producer and supporter’ of this order. Since 1945 and especially after the end of the Cold War, it emerged as the sole hegemon and effectively led this order. As the hegemon, the US provided stability in this order since it was “built around the American provision of security and economic public goods, mutually agreeable rules and institutions, and interactive political processes… ”.
Indeed, the US entrenched its position as the global hegemon by providing extensive financial assistance, playing a central role in establishing multilateral institutions like the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the Breton Woods System, encouraging multilateral cooperation and weaving a network of security partnerships. In effect, owing to its position as the hegemon and its steadfast support for the liberal international order which it helped to establish, the US was the guarantor who ensured that the stability of the order would be maintained. American optimism and support for this order was premised on the fact that the order benefited the US by achieving “a marriage between America’s internationalist principles and its strategic interests”.
However, since 2017, the US has adopted a pessimistic view about the existing order. During the Trump and Biden administrations, the US has become a reluctant hegemon unwilling to bear the costs of ensuring the stable functioning of that order. Since 2017, the US has become more inward-looking and shunned aspects of its liberal internationalism which emerged as the hallmarks of the rules-based order which it led for decades. Today, Washington appears to be turning away from the ‘Washington Consensus’ and other multilateral institutions which it helped establish.
For the Indo-Pacific region, this is therefore a period wherein the hegemon is unwilling and reluctant to provide the stability which is needed for ensuring the smooth functioning of the existing order. In other words, the region is currently in a phase wherein the stationary bandit is a replicating roving bandit. The stationary bandit is unwilling to offer the necessary public goods for ongoing economic growth and stability while still expecting to extract maximum tax revenues from the populace.
As a result, the regional architecture is in a state of flux and prone to instability. As former President Obama observed, “the rulebook is up for grabs” in the Indo-Pacific. America’s reluctance to provide this hegemonic stability has left a vacuum- at least in the economic sphere- and other countries will try to fill this void.
In this post-unipolar world, the US not only has to contend with addressing the consequences of China’s rise but is also faced with several regional middle powers who have divergent goals and interests.
These Indo-Pacific states do not view China or the prevailing world order through the same lens as the US. In recent years, China has emerged as the largest trading partner for several of these Indo-Pacific states. Indeed, continued cooperation with China is vital for the economic growth of states like India and the China’s trade relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the largest in the world.
Given China’s indispensable role in the economic fortunes of the region, even those Indo-Pacific states that have competing geopolitical claims with China find it difficult to accept America’s zero-sum view on international trade and cooperation with China. As one scholar argues, US initiatives which draw countries into an ‘anti-China coalition’ can act as ‘lightningrods’ and push countries away from the US.
Instead of compelling Indo-Pacific states to choose either the US or China, the region needs a self-confident America that believes that the liberal order which it led indeed continues to serve its interests and that of the region. According to one observer, fears about the US losing its primacy since the existing order does not serve its interest are “exaggerated”. Several parameters indicate that American primacy is, in fact, still intact.
The US has a substantially larger GDP per capita than China and is the only G7 economy to experience a steady linear increase in its GDP per capita despite crises such as the global financial crash of 2008. The US Dollar continues to be the reserve currency of the world dominating trading and financial markets. The US retains its hard power capabilities and continues to maintain a formidable blue water Navy with a strong presence in the Indo-Pacific. Although China has access to advanced technologies which allows it to dominateareas like electrical vehicles and batteries, the US is still making significant advances and has a leading edge in areas such as AI and bioengineering.
In effect, a self-confident America that is not consumed by concerns of its own diminishing power and instead focuses on preserving the international order will wield more influence in the region compared to a scenario where it pressures Indo-Pacific states to pick sides between the US and China. Crucially, this will enable the US to provide the certainty and stability which is needed for the functioning of the international order. Indo-Pacific middle powers and small states alike will welcome this constructive American role in the region as this would prevent the further erosion of the existing order, particularly since several Indo-Pacific states have benefitted from the stable functioning of this order.
A confident and self-assured America, knowing that it is not in decline due to the current rules-based order, will be better positioned to interact with the region in a more constructivemanner. By overcoming its fear of perceived decline and acknowledging that Indo-Pacific nations can engage in a 'diversified array of economic partnerships' - even including collaboration with China - the US may garner increased support from regional countries. In doing so, the US will not only reassure regional states it is a reliable and predictable hegemon as it was before 2017, but also re-emerge as the hegemon that provides the stability which is being sought by states in the region.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.