The Sky Is the Limit: How Thai–Cambodian Conflicts Reinforce the Power of the Thai Military

In the aftermath of the “Bloody May” of 1992, several Thai military officers wore civilian clothing when appearing in public, wary of anti-military sentiment among the Thai middle class, who saw the military as a structural impediment to the country’s democratization. Three decades on, the Thai army now enjoys unprecedented support and near-untouchable status, riding a wave of nationalism fueled by border tensions with Cambodia. It is allowed to do almost anything in the name of national security. This climate is likely to endure longer than many anticipate—particularly with a general election just around the corner.

A decade ago, the discourse on what soldiers are for resonated strongly in Thai society, as military intervention was widely viewed as a divisive force and a constraint on Thailand’s democratization, particularly in light of the political and economic privileges enjoyed by senior officers during two decades in which no external enemy existed. Today, it is the other way around. Even a progressive political party like the People’s Party has had to come to terms with the fact that it cannot go against the public’s increasingly positive view of the military during the Thai–Cambodian war. Pita Limjaroenrat, a former candidate for prime minister, recently apologized for remarks he made during the 2023 election campaign questioning the purpose of the military. Surely, many would argue that the context then and now is entirely different. Yet this alone underscores the current status of the Thai military, which has come to be widely perceived as a national hero tasked with defending the dignity and sovereignty of the Kingdom.

Permission to Do Anything    

The leaked conversation between former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Senate President Hun Sen appeared conciliatory toward the Cambodian strongman and ultimately brought down both Paetongtarn’s premiership and the Shinawatra dynasty. However, the gist of the leaked phone call—one that many seem to overlook—lies in Paetongtarn’s attempt to convince Hun Sen that the then Commander of the Second Army Region, General Boonsin Padklang, was on “the opposite side”.  While this created an uproar among Thais who believed that her conversation damaged the country’s dignity and ultimately led to her political downfall, it also highlights the reality that the civilian government holds no real power over the army’s decision-making.

The military appears to operate with permission from the establishment and with the blessing of the public to do whatever it deems necessary to protect Thailand’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Before his retirement, General Boonsin, on several occasions, even boasted about submitting daily reports to the palace, underscoring his approval from the King in managing border clashes. More importantly, he publicly told the press that “after six hours of fighting, I received a call telling me to stop firing—but I refused.” This statement alone serves as a litmus test for Thai society, prompting questions about who actually gave the order to the Second Army Region Commander. In other words, this was the moment when it became clear that the momentum had swung decisively toward the Thai military.

Two implications arise from Thailand’s new political landscape, where the military is in the driver’s seat: the trajectory of the new government’s playbook—regardless of political spectrum or ideology—which revolves around catering to military interests and playing the nationalist card, and the militarization of Thailand’s security policy.

Rally ‘round the Flag

When Anutin Charnvirakul was handpicked by the Thai establishment to become prime minister, the ongoing crises along the border appeared to be a legacy he would have to inherit. In fact, Anutin and the Bhumjaithai Party capitalized on the Thai–Cambodian conflict, winning the hearts and minds of Thai citizens who believe that the government and the military are doing the right thing. Following days of clashes with Cambodia, Prime Minisr Anutin, donning the military fatigues of the Volunteer Defense Corps, visited Ta Kwai Temple and Hill 350—areas that Thailand had regained control of. His visit was not intended to boost the morale of frontline soldiers or to honor the fallen, but was clearly driven by political motives.  The Prime Minister also posted a photo of himself saluting the Thai national flag against a backdrop of demolition rubble on his personal Facebook page. Notably, some Thais embrace this nationalist sentiment are even considering voting for the Bhumjaithai Party. If Anutin’s nationalist and military appeal is effective, why have other parties not adopted a similar approach at this critical juncture ahead of the upcoming general election on February 8?

While the People’s Party has clearly compromised with the military to broaden its political base amid rising nationalist fervor, its stance on military reform and the abolition of compulsory conscription remains unchanged. The Pheu Thai Party, having learned lessons from the Paetongtarn administration, has adopted a more comprehensive and less confrontational approach toward the military. It supports maintaining a strong military force to protect the country’s sovereignty and also proposes integrating digital-driven strategies to safeguard and enhance Thailand’s security. The ultra-conservative Ruam Thai Sang Chart Party campaigns on flagship policies that include combat pay of 200,000 baht per mission, voluntary military conscription with financial incentives of up to 30,000 baht, and the complete cancellation of MOU 43 and MOU 44 —concerning the land boundary demarcation between Thailand and Cambodia and the overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand, respectively. The return of Abhisit Vejjajiva as leader of the Democrat Party also reflects a familiar strategy: adopting a proactive stance on border conflicts, pledging to hold a national referendum to revoke the MOUs with Phnom Penh, and promoting the idea of free education for military personnel who have served for at least four years.

By and large, parties across the political spectrum are likely to center their campaigns on nationalism infused with a pro-military stance, or at the very least adopt a more military-friendly position than in the 2023 election. As long as border tensions persist, this trajectory of Thailand’s political landscape over the next four years is likely to benefit the Thai military.

Militarization of Thailand’s Foreign Policy

When the military reigns supreme, it tends to operate beyond the traditional chain of command. In other words, decision-making on Thailand’s security policy rests, to a significant extent, in the hands of the top brass. This could wreak havoc on Thailand’s international standing as well as its long-term economic growth. In 2026, the Thai economy is projected to grow by only 1.5–2 percent. This should be a pressing concern for the government. Yet the trajectory of Thailand’s foreign policy—despite attempts to reclaim regional leadership—appears to be moving in the opposite direction of the famous policy introduced under Chatchai Choonhavan’s administration. Thailand is now turning a marketplace into a battlefield.

It is unwise for any political party to confront the military at a time when public support for it appears unprecedentedly high. However, if this blind support continues, it will not only be the military budget or procurement for the army, navy, and air force that becomes limitless in the name of national security, but also the growing militarization of Thai foreign policy. Combined with rising chauvinism, this is a recipe for disaster.

Ideally, it is time for a civilian government to take control of Thai foreign policy and remove the military’s influence from the decision-making process. Otherwise, the military will do what it is trained to do best—wage war. As the saying goes, where you stand depends on where you sit. It is not difficult to see where the military stands; the real challenge lies in whether civilian leaders are willing to assert authority and steer the country away from a militarized path.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.

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Author

Thapiporn Suporn is Assistant Professor in International Relations at Khon Kaen University International College (KKUIC), Thailand.

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