Imperfect Choices: Small States and Liked-Mindedness in an Age of Turbulence

2026 has started with a stark reminder that the benign international order is crumbling and state actors with the capabilities seem to be intent on imposing their will on other states using varieties of force. Now more than ever, the issues of finding like-minded partners for small states like New Zealand are being underscored.

When the US announced the successful raid of Venezuela and the subsequent capture of deposed President Nicolás Maduro, it sparked a myriad of responses from countries around the world. Expectedly, countries within the Latin America region reacted strongly, especially those that may be perceived to have antagonistic relationship with either the US (Cuba) or with Trump (Brazil). In New Zealand, former Prime Minister Helen Clark was unflinching in her criticism of the operation, calling the attack illegal.

The Trump administration followed this attack on Venezuela with a further announcement that Trump had signed a memorandum which withdrew the US from 66 international organisations and treaties, a stunning repudiation of the very international institutions that the US was foundational in setting up, making the start to 2026 a damning indictment of the state of the international arena and its institutions. Trump’s policy adviser Stephen Miller summed it up when he said that “(w)e live in a world, in the real world, Jake, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.”

The US under Trump 2.0 is seemingly intent on dismantling the post-war international order that it has underwritten, driven by the belief that the current system no longer serves American interests. Actions like the unilateral use of force in taking down Maduro or the insistence on taking over Greenland from a NATO ally have caused consternation amongst the US alliance network, and more importantly, served as an important reminder to the small states that make up the world that they have been really lucky in the 80 years since World War II to live in a period of time where bigger countries were willing to agree to some semblance of constraints by international law.

The actions of the US since the beginning of Trump 2.0 now serve as a stark reminder that the rules and institutions that protect smaller states from the mercy of the realist, hard power actions of bigger states are hard to rely on. This serves as a further impetus of these small states to seek for partners in all forms to balance against the incoming chaos.

In Search of Like-Mindedness

Small states like New Zealand have been scrambling to deepen partnerships with other states in order to protect their own interests in light of this fracturing of global order. In the contemporary narrative, the term that has been bandied around when talking about these deepening partnerships has been “liked-minded”. The usage of like-minded (or likeminded) seems to allude to a criterion for which countries seek to partner with each other and often imply a certain shared interests or beliefs about how the world should be.

Aotearoa has often used the term like-minded when referring to its participation in the Five Eyes network and its working relationships with its Five Eyes partners, the US, UK, Canada and Australia. In its 2024-2025 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Annual Report, New Zealand also acknowledged that the shifting geopolitical situation necessitated a need to “apply renewed attentiveness to likeminded partners”. Yet searching for like-mindedness is not so simple. The MFAT report identifies several states that New Zealand considers to be likeminded partners but doesn’t fully define what it means by likeminded. In fact, in the contemporary usage of the term, there has been a lack of clear definition regarding what criteria is used to decide if a country is likeminded.

If likemindeness refers to certain shared interests or beliefs, what are the specific interests or beliefs that should be used to judge the level of likemindedness? One could argue that countries in the international arena essentially look to cooperate in three main spheres/areas of interests: economy, security (strategy) and values. The level to which two countries are therefore likeminded would depend on the amount of overlap between their economic interests or strategic interests or the level of shared values, or even a combination of the three as can be seen from Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: The Venn Diagram of Liked-Mindedness (adapted from works by Tomohiko Satake and Cheng Chwee Kuik)

Imperfect Choices

The struggle for small states like Aotearoa in this age of turbulence is that finding the perfect likeminded partner is difficult. While likemindedness can cover the three spheres of shared values, economic interests and strategic interests, finding a partner that sits in the middle of the Venn diagram in Figure 1 is incredibly difficult. New Zealand’s MFAT annual report named Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada (i.e. the other members of the Five Eyes) in that order when talking about likeminded partner. Of the four, arguably, only Australia sits firmly in the middle of the diagram, given their close geographical location and the share cultural history the two states have. It is thus not a surprise that Australia is New Zealand’s only formal ally. While the UK and Canada have shared values with Aotearoa given their common roots in the Anglosphere, it is hard to perceive that the current strategic interests of the countries are all aligned. And it is increasingly difficult for New Zealand to say that Trump 2.0 US is truly a likeminded partner.

China on the other hand is likeminded with New Zealand given their shared economic interests, but the two countries do not align over values and strategic interests. Perhaps other than Australia, the other two members of the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4), Japan and South Korea, may be said to occupy the optimum alignment of interests. India, who this coalition government seems to place a very high level of importance upon, is much like China where the alignment of interests seems to be more economic than the rest. Similarly, when looking at its Southeast Asian neighbours, many of them align with New Zealand on economic and strategic interests but not on values.

The challenge in finding perfect likeminded states is symptomatic of the choices that are facing small states in this current age. As the world gets more chaotic and the current rules-based order is left to the wayside, it becomes increasingly important for small states to search for partners who can ride out the storm with them. That being the case, small states have to adopt an attitude of “beggars cannot be choosers” and embrace the imperfect choices that lay before them.

For a country like New Zealand, navigating a new world order that is characterised by unpredictability and volatility means needing to build the strength and capability to ensure that they can project their voices. The ability and agency to be heard is directly tied to the relevance of the nation and by investing in its defence and focusing on growing its economy, New Zealand will take the steps to maintain said relevance. The ability to take these steps is also rooted in embracing the imperfect choices for partnerships, now more than ever, multilateral arrangements like the CPTPP and RCEP will provide opportunities for the country to grow and while the members may not all be in perfect likemindedness with New Zealand, perhaps imperfect likemindedness is what is needed to survive a volatile world.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.

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  Author

Orson Tan is senior research fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs, and has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.

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