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ISSN 2816-1971

Thailand’s Third PM in a Year: Anutin and the Politics of Survival

  • Suthikarn Meechan
  • Sep 10
  • 4 min read

On September 5, Bhumjaithai Party leader Anutin Charnvirakul seized the spotlight when parliament elected him prime minister with 311 votes. His decisive victory underscored Thailand's ongoing political volatility, making him the country’s third prime minister in just over a year. This outcome came less than 24 hours after former premier Thaksin Shinawatra once again departed Thailand, a stark reminder of how the Shinawatra family’s presence—or absence—continues to shape Thai politics.

 

Anutin's rise followed the sudden fall of Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin's daughter and the recent face of the ruling party. She was removed not through a no-confidence vote or resignation, but by a Constitutional Court ruling that dismissed her for breaching ethics rules over a leaked phone call with Cambodia's Senate President Hun Sen. Although the conversation was private, it carried significant political implications. For many Thais, this episode felt all too familiar. Over the past two decades, the Shinawatra family has dominated electoral politics while repeatedly clashing with the judiciary and military. Previous institutional interventions toppled Thaksin in 2006 and Yingluck in 2014. The sidelining of Paetongtarn and the Pheu Thai party's agenda followed this same trajectory, clearing the way for a new contender.

 

Into this void stepped Anutin Charnvirakul, a conservative politician and construction magnate once considered second-tier. As Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Health during the pandemic, he faced criticism for failing to contain Covid-19, but gained notoriety in 2022 for championing cannabis decriminalization. This policy earned him the label of “cannabis crusader,” a controversial role that solidified his image as a political maverick willing to take populist risks. Yet Anutin’s real strength lies less in ideology than in pragmatism. Unlike the Shinawatras, who built their brand through mass populist mobilization, he relied on provincial networks and business ties, positioning himself as a coalition kingmaker while aligning with conservative, royalist generals who use nationalist rhetoric. His Bhumjaithai Party occupies a middle ground—small enough to remain flexible, yet large enough to be indispensable. In Thailand’s coalition politics, this made him the kingmaker—and, ironically, now the king.

 

Anutin secured the premiership through a strategic deal with the People’s Party, the main opposition. In exchange for their support, he agreed to dissolve parliament and hold early elections within four months. This bargain gave the opposition a path back to the ballot box while Anutin gained the top job. The irony is striking: an opposition that campaigned against elite domination effectively installed an establishment broker as prime minister. Yet in Thailand’s fractured political landscape, such contradictions are commonplace. Coalitions often form based on short-term calculations or survival rather than on shared principles.

 

Anutin's rise says more about the political system that enabled it than about him personally. Thailand’s political order, characterised by coups, judicial interventions, the dissolution of opposition parties, and fragile alliances, has been chronically unstable. The frequent turnover of prime ministers, with three in a single year, is no coincidence; it reflects deeper systemic dysfunction. Elite bargaining often subverts electoral outcomes, as seen in government formations in 2019 and 2023, undermines policy consistency, and turns parties into personal vehicles rather than institutions. Consequently, coalitions tend to deteriorate into unstable alliances of convenience. These dynamics frustrate ordinary Thais, as governments change frequently but governance rarely improves.

 

International observers should note that Thailand’s internal volatility directly limits its pivotal role in mainland Southeast Asia. This chronic instability undermines its capacity to lead ASEAN, especially regarding pressing crises like the civil war in Myanmar. Furthermore, frequent leadership changes stall long-term foreign policy initiatives and create unpredictable national security postures. This is reflected in Anutin's approach to the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, where his party has previously emphasized a strong military stance over diplomacy—a tendency regional neighbors watch warily. Demonstrating pragmatic governance, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet has pledged to work with the new Thai premier to resolve border tensions, showing that campaign rhetoric often yields to diplomatic necessity.

 

Anutin’s premiership also highlights a persistent regional challenge: the fragile process of democratic consolidation. Thailand remains a nation caught between vibrant electoral participation and weak institutions. The Constitutional Court's power to oust prime ministers, combined with backroom deals to install replacements, starkly illustrates democracy’s limits. Domestically, his coalition has outlined four urgent priorities —the economy, security, natural disasters, and social issues—to be addressed within a four-month timeframe. However, a tenure defined by brevity and constrained by coalition agreements limits his capacity for meaningful change.

 

For now, Thailand has a new prime minister. Anutin Charnvirakul, architect of Thailand’s cannabis decriminalization, is now at the helm. His rise was not the result of a broad electoral mandate but pragmatic deal-making—a reminder that survival often trumps reform in Thai politics. Yet beneath the headlines, the story is not really about Anutin himself, but about a system where power shifts rapidly but structural problems endure. Thailand cycles through leaders, yet deeper demands for accountability, reform, and stability remain unmet. For the Indo-Pacific region, Anutin’s premiership is just another chapter in Thailand’s long saga of political turbulence.

 

The legitimacy of Anutin’s rise is itself in question, as the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between his Bhumjaithai Party and the People's Party may violate the constitution and break prior commitments. This agreement, which included a pledge to support Anutin as prime minister and outlined a brief four-month minority government focused on several urgent priorities, raises concerns about adherence to constitutional norms and political transparency. Yet this technicality underscores a deeper issue: the real question is not whether Anutin can govern effectively during his short, pre-ordained tenure, but whether Thailand can finally break free from this recurring cycle of political instability—or whether his premiership is simply another chapter in a story marked by rapid leadership changes without lasting reform.


DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.

Author

Suthikarn Meechan is an Associate Professor at the College of Politics and Governance, Mahasarakham University in Thailand, and a non-resident research fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs based in Christchurch, New Zealand.


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