Global Conflict Places Myanmar’s Civilians on the Brink
- Adam E. Howe
- 7 minutes ago
- 5 min read
The rise in conflicts around the world and increasing uncertainty given the upheaval in the international arena poses a real humanitarian danger to the people of Myanmar.
The global ripple effects of U.S. military operations in Iran have become impossible to ignore. Food shortages and energy price hikes are squeezing Southeast Asia’s manufacturing and agricultural economies. While the war’s economic fallout has rightfully attracted international attention, policymakers must examine how ongoing conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine is contributing to political violence in other regions. For the long-suffering people of Myanmar- particularly ethnic and religious minorities- extended periods of geopolitical conflict will accelerate a pattern of brutality that predictably emerges during times of regime crisis.
Myanmar, formerly Burma, features a rich tapestry of ethnic minorities, mainly living along the country’s geographic periphery. Following independence from the British in 1948, diverse groups fought for territorial and political autonomy from the majority Bamar (Burmese) government, triggering the world’s longest running civil war. Decades of conflict between the military and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO’s) have resulted in mass displacement of ethnic Karen, Kayah, and Shan. Presently, the International Rescue Committee estimates that between approximately 96,000 refugees are living in camps along the Myanmar/Thai border. In Rakhine State, the Rohingya genocide has led to the external displacement of approximately 1 million civilians, with the majority fleeing to Bangladesh’s Cox Bazar, home to the world’s largest refugee camp. According to the UNHCR, approximately 4 million people are internally displaced, including many who fled their homes after the 2021 coup.
For decades, ethnic minorities in Myanmar have faced an impossible dilemma-remain in country and risk death at the hands of the military, militias, or EAO’s- or resettle in overcrowded and impoverished camps where scammers and human traffickers prey upon the marginalized. The situation for refugees has become untenable in the wake of USAID cuts, where malnutrition and disease have reached crisis levels. As the need for humanitarian aid grows, the willingness of the international community to provide it has attenuated.
Myanmar’s most recent humanitarian crisis emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. Global supply-chain disruptions wrought havoc on consumers and exporters, raising the price of everyday nutrition staples for the millions already struggling with food insecurity. The economic crisis was accelerated by the 2021 military coup which ignited a civil war between General Min Aung Hlaing’s regime and a coalition of pro-democracy activists and EAO’s. In the aftermath, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) launched new military operations aimed at recovering roughly 40% of territory lost during the war. These campaigns have indiscriminately targeted civilians in ethnic states through brutal air campaigns and scorched earth tactics. While this does not point to a wholesale shift in Tatmadaw’s military strategy, it lays bare a regime that appears increasingly desperate in the face of the greatest threat to its survival since the 2007 Saffron Revolution.
In addition to the civil war, the broader geopolitical landscape has changed in ways that leaves the regime economically vulnerable and more desperate for international support. Despite Min Aung Hlaing’s recent high-profile diplomatic overtures, its traditional allies are preoccupied with their own problems, all while the regime has lost its ability to make credible commitments to stakeholders. This puts additional pressure on Myanmar’s junta to shift its cost-benefit calculus, by doubling down on state violence as a means of reestablishing control over a failing state.
Russia, one of Myanmar’s few patrons, has now entered the fifth year of a pyrrhic war with Ukraine and faces severe equipment and personnel shortages. While the two countries have recently signed a defense pact, it is not clear that Russia can maintain its present level of military support for Myanmar in the long-term and still achieve victory in Ukraine. While Iran continues to fund Myanmar’s war through its shadow fleet, the periodic and unpredictable Strait of Hormuz closures, and corresponding surges in the price of fuel and fertilizer will do irreparable harm to Myanmar’s economy, even as the regime tries to isolate itself from the worst effects. In the meantime, Myanmar’s has deepened its ties with China. However, China is likely more interested in tightening its economic grip over Myanmar than propping up a teetering regime. As a regional hegemon, China largely dictates the terms of its economic relationship with Myanmar.
While Myanmar wants to project an image of strength through new international trade deals and diplomatic engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), including a highly publicized state visit with the Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, the regime faces a grim political reality. Amid a civil war without end, it could negotiate a peace agreement with the armed opposition, which will certainly mean ceding power, particularly in economically and strategically important areas of the country. A regime-initiated peace proposal could also unintentionally convey vulnerability to an emboldened armed opposition and invite new military offensives. As it stands, it appears that there is little appetite among regime elites for any conflict settlement. The regime might also be tempted to announce a slate of reforms and hope for new inflows of foreign aid from the international community to bolster its failing economy. Both propositions are risky as they signal weakness on both the political and economic fronts and come without firm guarantees of future support from their trade partners.
In the short term, it is likely that the regime will buy time by trying to break through a military stalemate at home while ramping up its international political and economic diplomatic efforts abroad with the hope that it can outlast its adversaries. Thus far, Myanmar’s regime has demonstrated an uncanny ability to navigate political and economic storms. It has survived crippling sanctions, international isolation, and civil war. Expert at repression, the durability of Myanmar’s praetorian state has long depended on the unity and cohesion of its military, which has experienced very few high-profile defections. However, Tatmadaw’s overreliance on repression has finally been met with such fierce and determined resistance that makes a return to the pre-2021 status quo of low-level, high intensity conflict virtually impossible.
When Myanmar’s regime finds itself backed in a corner, it has a pattern of violently lashing out against enemies-both real and perceived, as demonstrated by major domestic crackdowns in 1988, 2007, and 2021. Global geopolitical and economic crises brought on by the Iran War dangerously raise the stakes for a regime that is fighting for its survival, and by proxy, make living conditions for Myanmar’s marginalized civilians even more perilous.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.
Author
Adam E. Howe Ph.D. is a political scientist who specializes in Comparative Politics and International Relations. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University in 2019 and has held academic posts at Manhattan University, Utah State University, and Fairfield University. Dr. Howe’s grant-funded research explores state-society relations in non-democratic regimes across the Global South, with a focus on at-risk ethnic and religious groups. His work has appeared in the Diplomat, Tea Circle Oxford, the Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Politics, Groups, and Identities, and the Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs.