Myanmar, Thailand, and the Politics of Legitimacy

The junta-backed regime in Myanmar's recent trip to Thailand is a step towards addressing their international isolation, but such engagement carries with it plenty of issues as well.

Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to Thailand should be seen less as a real diplomatic achievement than as a move aimed at regaining legitimacy by taking part in regional affairs. Since suffering from international isolation for so long, the leader of the Myanmar military-backed regime is attempting to show himself as relevant, normal and accepted within the region by making a high-profile visit to Bangkok. However, the fundamental issue is not whether the journey will bring about visibility; it will, but whether it can lead to any substantial political or diplomatic results. On that point, expectations ought to be kept low.

Thailand has a special place in this situation for Myanmar and Min Aung Hlaing, himself. Not only is it Myanmar’s nearest neighbour and one of ASEAN’s founding members, but it also enjoys both real influence and symbolic importance. Because of this, Bangkok is an appealing location for a government that is still struggling to gain recognition in the region. The topics on the agenda of his trip concern both sides of the border and are by no means insignificant, while they are exactly the kind of issues that call for practical engagement, even if political relations remain heavily restricted.

At the same time, it is essential to recognise the limits of such involvement. Since the military in Myanmar does not have complete control of the country, the existence of this fragmentation weakens the credibility of any commitments it might make. Thailand might thus achieve some short-term cooperation or limited coordination, but it is very unlikely to get lasting guarantees. Thailand may help promote dialogue, but it cannot confer the strategic legitimacy the junta is seeking, nor can it resolve Myanmar’s wider political crisis.

This point is important because Thailand is increasingly acting as a go-between for Myanmar and ASEAN. If Bangkok focuses on helping Myanmar rejoin ASEAN without securing actual improvements, it might end up supporting a regime that has shown little progress and could diminish ASEAN’s limited power to ensure Myanmar follows the Five-Point Consensus. The fact that Min Aung Hlaing rejected the Five-Point Consensus in his 100-day speech and in the motion approved by the Union Parliament, along with his claims that some ASEAN members are unfair to Myanmar, reveals a lack of diplomatic clarity and underscores the inconsistency of the junta’s position. More importantly, it shows that the regime wants to obtain benefits from ASEAN while avoiding its political obligations. The fact that the visit is taking place currently suggests that the junta intends to present itself as a victim of isolation and to leverage regional engagement.

Thailand ought to keep on dealing with Myanmar over matters important to its own interests, but this should take place within a disciplined, conditional and transactional approach. Action, not just words, should form the basis of any cooperation. Thailand should not insist on Myanmar’s return to ASEAN unless there are sustained political advances together with real responsiveness to the expectations of people in the region and those who have a stake in the area, for example by implementing the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus and by releasing Aung San Suu Kyi and other important persons. If these conditions are not met, then supporting Myanmar’s reintegration would be too early.

The main issues for Thailand include border security, trade, migrant workers, drug enforcement, and cross-border crime. Although the regime’s authority in Nay Pyi Taw is often restricted and varies, it still has a considerable impact on several border matters. It makes sense to manage the risks involved. However, pragmatism does not imply trust.This is especially important because both sides might interpret limited functional cooperation as an indication of improved relations. In reality, it usually only proves that each side is essential to the other, not that there is real alignment. Thailand needs to be cautious in its response to this strategy. If it wants to be a real friend to Myanmar, that friendship should be based on accountability, not just goodwill. Thailand should seek clear commitments, set deadlines, and expect measurable results and major political reforms in Myanmar. Meanwhile, the two countries’ trade should be normalised on conditional, reciprocal and transparent terms. Without clear safeguards, economic engagement could lead to greater imbalance rather than to stability. The regional consequences are also important. Given the spillover effects from Myanmar, which must be considered, it is reasonable for Thailand to seek to stabilise its border.

The fact that Min Aung Hlaing went to Thailand exemplifies ASEAN diplomacy, illustrating the tension between practical engagement and political principles, and the balance between short-term stability and long-term credibility. Thailand may need to engage with Myanmar, but the regime should not be legitimised. This visit is not a breakthrough, although it does indicate that the junta is still making efforts to obtain regional acceptance without carrying out any real reforms at home, while the neighbouring countries prefer cooperation without becoming involved in politics. While this approach might bring about some short-term advantages, it does not address the fundamental crisis. Thailand should concentrate on achieving practical results without normalising military rule, and it must maintain this careful balance in its policy.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.

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Author

Wai Yan Phyo Naing is a visiting scholar at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan, and an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR-Myanmar). He has a Ph.D. in History with a focus on International Affairs and International Regional Studies from the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow and his research areas include Myanmar studies, Asia-Pacific studies, Myanmar foreign policy, Myanmar-China and Myanmar-Russia relations, Taiwan studies, and Myanmar migrant issues in Thailand.

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