Myanmar and Russia: Trust-Based Diplomacy or Transactional Partnership?
- Wai Yan Phyo Naing
- 13 minutes ago
- 6 min read
The Myanmar-Russia relationship is growing, and deserves a deeper analysis on the incentives for both parties to pursue deeper ties.
The growing ties between Myanmar and Russia should not be seen only from one side. It is not simply about Russia expanding its influence in Southeast Asia, and it is not only about Myanmar looking for protection. The more realistic argument is that both sides are using each other at a difficult political moment. Russia wants loyal partners, new markets, and a stronger place in Asia. Myanmar’s regime wants weapons, political and diplomatic recognition, energy cooperation, and international support at a time when it faces pressure at home and abroad. This is why the relationship has become more active since the 2021 coup. Myanmar’s military junta has been isolated by many Western countries and criticised by regional and international actors. In this situation, Russia has become useful because it does not treat the junta as an unwanted partner. Moscow givesNaypyidaw diplomatic space, military offers a doorway into Southeast Asia, a market for arms and energy projects, and a partner willing to support Russian interests in international and regional forums.
Min Aung Hlaing’s repeated visits to Russia show that Myanmar’s foreign policy direction is moving forward with a survival-based diplomacy. His seventh visit to Russia is not just a normal diplomatic exchange. It shows that he sees Moscow as one of his most important external backers. The fact that Putin has not yet visited Myanmar, while Min Aung Hlaing has gone to Russia many times, also tells us something about the imbalance in this relationship. These situations clearly show that Myanmar needs Russia more visibly than Russia needs Myanmar. Furthermore, his series of visits shows that Myanmar’s foreign policy is becoming more security-centred and less balanced, while also focusing on seeking legitimacy since he became the so-called president.
Previously, Myanmar tried to maintain relations with various powers and avoid relying too heavily on one side, as during the presidencies of President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi. Yet since the 2021 coup, the military leadership has found itself with fewer choices and has therefore had to seek out countries which can supply it with weapons, offer it political support, and establish economic ties without requiring it to make democratic reforms. Russia is a country that meets this requirement, and that is why the current meetings in Moscow are important both from a diplomatic and a domestic point of view, since they enable the military regime to demonstrate that it is not alone.
Myanmar is becoming one of Russia’s most reliable partners in Southeast Asia, but this reliability is shaped more by short-term needs than by deep trust. Min Aung Hlaing calls the country a “reliable partner” for Russia, and Moscow also values Naypyidaw’s support for Russia-ASEAN relations. This language matters because Russia is trying to show that it still has friends beyond its traditional sphere, beyond Europe and the US. At the same time, Naypyidaw also wants to show ASEAN and the West that it has strong international partners despite sanctions and criticism. However, the partnership is still driven by urgent needs. Myanmar needs military supplies, spare parts, aircraft, radar systems, training, and diplomatic support. Meanwhile, Russia needs buyers, partners and political friends as it faces pressure from the West.
The five-year military cooperation agreement signed in 2026 suggests, and recent joint military exercises between the two countries in Myanmar suggest that the ties seem to be becoming more formal. However, it does not mean the two countries have built a balanced strategic alliance. It is more like a practical arrangement between two governments under pressure. The military dimension remains the strongest part of the relationship. Russia has long been one of Myanmar’s major arms suppliers, second only to China in earlier data. Since the coup, this has become even more important. Myanmar’s armed forces are fighting resistance groups across the country, and their ability to maintain air power and heavy weapons depend partly on external support. Russia’s backing, therefore, helps the junta continue its military campaign. This is why the partnership has serious consequences for Myanmar’s domestic conflict.
Energy cooperation gives the relationship a longer-term shape. Russia’s support for a small nuclear power plant project in Myanmar is presented as a symbol of friendship and development. It also allows Moscow to move beyond arms sales and enter Myanmar’s infrastructure future, even as there are questions about Myanmar’s financial capacity to invest in a USD-billion project. For Myanmar, nuclear energy is always described as a way to support development and modernisation. But such projects also create dependence on Russian technology, finance, expertise, and political goodwill. This means that energy cooperation may not only diversify Myanmar’s options but also tie the country more closely to Moscow.
The question of China is also important. Myanmar may want to sue Russia to reduce overdependence on China, but this strategy has limits. For many years, China has been Myanmar’s most powerful neighbour, investor, and diplomatic actor. The junta may feel uncomfortable depending too much on Beijing, especially because China has its own interests along the border, in infrastructure projects, and in ethnic conflict management. In this sense, Russia gives Myanmar another external pillar that allows the junta to say that it is not fully dependent on China. However, Russia cannot replace China since China shares a border with Myanmar, exerts considerable economic influence over the country, and is directly engaged in regional security matters. Russia, on the other hand, is distant and provides mainly military, diplomatic, technological, and symbolic assistance. Although Myanmar might make use of Russia in order to counterbalance China to some extent, it cannot escape the profound impact that China has. What Myanmar is doing is not genuine diversification but merely introducing another level of dependence.
This is the main difficulty for Myanmar’s foreign policy. If Myanmar relies on China for economic and border stability, and on Russia for arms, energy, and diplomatic protection, it may not become more independent. It may become trapped between two powerful partners, both of whom support the junta for their own interests. Such dependence may protect the regime in the short term, but it does not solve Myanmar’s deeper political crisis.
For Russia, the relationship is useful because it strengthens Moscow’s claim that it remains active in Asia. Myanmar gives Russia a loyal partner in ASEAN-related diplomacy and a place to expand cooperation in energy, defence, technology, finance, tourism, and education. The acceptance of Russia’s payment system in parts of Myanmar, the use of Rubles in bilateral operations, and the discussion of oil refineries and power plants all show that the relationship is widening. Moscow is not only selling weapons, but it is also trying to build a wider network of influence in the ASEAN region. Still, the partnership should not be romanticised because it is built on isolation, arms, and survival more than shared vision. Myanmar’s junta is using Russia to gain protection and legitimacy. Russia is using Myanmar to expand influence and show that it still has reliable partners in Southeast Asia. Both sides benefit, but those benefits are mostly for the ruling elites, not necessarily for both citizens.
In the end, the relationship between Myanmar and Russia shows the foreign policy of a government under pressure. Min Aung Hlaing’s many visits to Moscow show that the junta is seeking outside support to survive both politically and militarily. Russia’s warm welcome shows that Moscow sees Myanmar as a loyal customer in a changing world. For Myanmar, though, this relationship is risky. It might reduce some dependence on China, but it also creates new dependence on Russia. It may give the junta some breathing room, but it does not bring the country any closer to peace, especially with current tensions in Europe.
The real question is not whether Russia can help Myanmar with weapons, energy, or diplomatic cover. The real question is whether this partnership helps Myanmar move toward stability, reconciliation, and a more legitimate political future. At the moment, the answer is not encouraging. The relationship may strengthen the two countries’ leadership, but it may also deepen Myanmar’s isolation and keep the country locked in a longer cycle of conflict.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.
Author
Wai Yan Phyo Naing is a visiting scholar at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan, and an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR-Myanmar). He has a Ph.D. in History with a focus on International Affairs and International Regional Studies from the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow and his research areas include Myanmar studies, Asia-Pacific studies, Myanmar foreign policy, Myanmar-China and Myanmar-Russia relations, Taiwan studies, and Myanmar migrant issues in Thailand.