With a new political reality in Bangladesh, Dhaka-Beijing ties has mostly shown continuity in momentum, some visible shifts and limited uncertainties.
The foundation of Bangladesh-China relations is deeply rooted in a wide spectrum of areas like political relations, defence and security, trade, commerce and investment, development assistance and people-to-people connectivity. China's longstanding principle of non-interference in Bangladesh's domestic politics makes it easier for Beijing to adapt to changes in political circumstances and maintain good ties with different governments, political parties, business communities, and civil society in the past. Similarly, since former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina flew away to India, the Awami League (AL) government was toppled, and the interim government led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus was sworn in, Beijing shows continuity in momentum and some speedy moves since August 5th in adjusting to political circumstances in Bangladesh.
Continuity
The visit of President Xi Jinping in 2016 to Bangladesh and Dhaka joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has notably upgraded Bangladesh-China relations. In 2024, both countries have improved ties by establishing a comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership. AL government and China's rock-solid relationship even led some analysts to say Bangladesh was tilting towards China. With the interim government taking charge, Bangladesh aspires to maintain a strong relationship with China and prefers to maintain a balanced relationship with major powers. China also seeks to further strengthen its 'all-around strategic partnership' with the interim government of Bangladesh. China's cooperation with non-political governments is not something new; previously Beijing also provided international support and recognition to Fakruddin Ahmed's caretaker government. The engagement of Chinese ambassador with multiple advisors of the interim government reflects Beijing’s eagerness in continuing the momentum of multidimensional ties with Bangladesh. The interaction between Dr. Muhammad Yunus and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi during United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the UN headquarters in New York shows both interim government of Bangladesh and Chinas’ willingness of mutual cooperation between the two countries. Apart from maintaining good political relations, defence and security cooperation will likely experience a continuity. According to SIPRI, a world-renowned defence and security think tank, China supplied 72% of weapons to Bangladesh between 2019 and 2023. In the past, while the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government was in power, Bangladesh and China signed a historic defence agreement in 2002. China also looks forward to continuing the defence and security cooperation with the interim government of Bangladesh and which is likely to continue when a democratically elected government comes to power in future.
Since 2005, China has been biggest trading partner of Bangladesh, with bilateral trade currently valued over $25 billionand well positioned in the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of Bangladesh. Since Bangladesh and other less developed countries (LDCs) will enjoy zero-tariff access while exporting to China starting in December 2024, Dhaka will look forward to reducing the longstanding issue of imbalanced trade. As the interim government of Bangladesh is working to strengthen economic governance and is determined to implement anti-corruption measures, these are likely to help building the confidence of the investors and attract more investment from China and beyond. As Dhaka looks to revive its economy, China will undoubtedly remain Bangladesh's major trading, commerce and investment partner. As Dhaka and New Delhi are finding it difficult to return to normalcy since the fall of the AL government, this might open up further cooperation between Dhaka and Beijing in the energy, public health, disaster management, education and farming sectors. When China's medical team came to treat people injured in the July-August uprising, providing $20,000 for flood-affected people and hosted Dhaka-China Day at North South University reflects Beijing's willingness to continue the people-to-people bonding between the two countries. Also, Dhaka will continue to seek Beijing's commitment and support in solving the Rohingya refugee crisis.
Shifts
The change in the political landscape in Bangladesh also comes with a particular impact on South Asian geopolitics. Although India and China compete to improve economic, security, and connectivity ties in other South Asian countries, neither competing power showed a clear divergence of interest regarding Bangladesh during the AL era. However, coming to power for the fourth consecutive term, Hasina favoured India over China for the Teesta project, which Beijing had been eyeing for some time. This made the AL government to lose its footing in the Beijing-New Delhi balancing. With the change in Bangladesh's political scenario, Beijing and New Delhi's divergence of interest are becoming more visible, and two competing powers might interact with Bangladesh differently at least in near future.
A significant area of China's speedy move since August 5th has been the nature of engagement with political parties in Bangladesh. In early September 2024, the Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh, Mr. Yao Wen, had courtesy meeting with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) at the party's central office in Dhaka. This is seen as a significant shift in willingness to engage with JI by trying to reestablish and restart the cooperation, which has gone missing for some time, probably due to a good political relationship with AL. Similarly, the Chinese envoys' meeting with the BNP delegation shows Beijing's willingness to strengthen ties with major political parties who have been in the AL opposition camp. Since former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia has been inactive in mainstream politics and the party's senior politician like Lt Gen (Retd) Mahbubur Rahman, a good friend of China, retired from politics, BNP lost its momentum in maintaining strong ties with China like before. Although most major political parties, including BNP and Jatiya Party (JP), have not been left behind case by China during the AL era, party-to-party relations with CCP and other political parties in Bangladesh were not as strong as seen with AL in the last few years. In 2019, AL and CCP signed a MoU to increase party-to-party ties, which led to frequent delegation visits between AL and alliance party leaders with CCP. Previously, no similar arrangement was visible between CCP and BNP, JP, or JI, as seen with AL.
Another visible shift is Dhaka's emphasis towards green and renewable energy sources in energy corporations. In the past, most of China's energy sector investments mainly involved coal-fired power plants, adversely affecting the climate and environment. Prof Muhammad Yunus, who has long been a champion in promoting net zero carbon emission, has urged China to relocate solar panel factories to Bangladesh, helping the country towards a green transition. In the future, any energy or development cooperation with China are unlikely to overlook any environmental concerns.
Uncertainties
In post-revolution Bangladesh, Dhaka-Beijing ties mostly show continuity, shifts, and limited uncertainties. One of the major uncertainties might be Bangladesh's unwillingness to commit to many infrastructure or mega projects, which has been the foundation of Dhaka-China relations since Bangladesh joined BRI. The interim government has already called for a review of all foreign-funded projects and to exclude projects that are not urgently needed or are less beneficial. Some projects that might have been in the pipeline or in progress (in the starting phase) might face some uncertainty and discontinuity, which might upset Beijing. Bangladesh has already requested China to lower its existing loan interest rates from 2-3 percent to 1 percent and extend the repayment period from 20 years to 30 years. Another uncertainty that might affect Bangladesh-China relations is the new development of deep Dhaka-Washington ties, which will continue during the Yunus era and with a possibility even when Dhaka returns to democracy. How Beijing sees and responds to Washington's overwhelming support towards Dhaka will also determine the future of Bangladesh-China relations.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.
Author
Raian Hossain is a doctoral researcher at the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK. He is also a lecturer (currently on study leave) in the Department of Global Studies and Governance (GSG) at Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB). His areas of expertise include Indo-Pacific affairs, the US-China-India strategic triangle, Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh’s politics and foreign policy, and the Taiwan Issue in Sino-U.S. relations.