The State of Leadership in Southeast Asia: Are the winds turning in ASEAN?

Recent survey results show a shift in the perception of who provides the regional leadership in Southeast Asia and asks questions about the dynamics within ASEAN.

In the latest ISEAS State of Southeast Asia Survey Report, Singapore is recognised as the leading contributor in addressing key regional challenges (31.3%), followed by Indonesia (22.2%) and Malaysia (21.3%). Together, these three countries account for the majority of the responses, while other Southeast Asian countries received very little recognition.  In the 2024 and 2025 editions of the survey, Singapore and Indonesia also led, although the question then asked in these years focused on member states’ contributions to ASEAN’s long-term development. With pressing issues such as the South China Sea dispute, the Myanmar crisis, climate change, the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict, and the state of the digital economy facing the region, the question that begs to be asked is: despite Indonesia being recognized as the long-time leader of the region, has it finally been overtaken by Singapore as ASEAN’s de facto leader?

While the results in the last three surveys are not enough to make a good trend analysis, the latest results tell us a lot about what Singapore has been doing regionally and domestically, as much as tells us about what Indonesia’s priorities are under Prabowo Subianto. By and large, Indonesia still remains the region’s natural leader and will remain so in the years to come. Even before Prabowo, Indonesia has had to deal with a slew of domestic structural and institutional issues as well as unrest, sapping its energy and attention from regional affairs. However, Indonesia’s foreign policy under Prabowo seems to be moving in a confusing direction and is an important factor as to why this year’s survey participants look more to Singapore for leadership.

Singapore has proven itself a “safe hand” with respect to regional stability. For instance, Singapore has maintained a position that has allowed it to have a strong, open relationship with both the US and China, allowing it to act as a trusted go-between between these two competing powers, as well as a link between ASEAN and the EU. Second, Singapore has also pushed for initiatives that support regional integration, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the regional digital economy framework.  More importantly, as the Southeast Asia survey includes business leaders in the region, the role of Singapore as a regional hub for global trade cannot be overemphasized. Its ability to facilitate ease of investing, efficiency, and high levels of trust in its world-class financial, digital, and logistics infrastructure. In this sense, Singapore represents a safe and high-functioning leader that will gain the trust of constituencies in a time of global and regional uncertainty, where great powers cannot always be relied upon to underwrite regional stability and help address regional challenges.

On the one hand, Prabowo appears to have stuck with the long-standing commitment to a hedging foreign policy, which is captured in the oft-repeated phrase “bebas dan aktif” (free and active) foreign policy. Thus, at the level of rhetoric, Prabowo has toed the line established by his predecessors insofar as carefully balancing Indonesia’s position with the great powers is concerned. The PRC remains Indonesia’s largest trading partner, while the US is an important security partner. Early into his term, Prabowo travelled to Beijing first, then to Washington (brushing aside what many perceived as his first major gaffe---the joint statement with the PRC on the South China Sea issue, which the Indonesian Foreign Ministry had to clarify). This was followed by visits to several other partners, which suggested at that time  Prabowo might not depart significantly from the Jokowi-era foreign policy.

However, Prabowo seemed intent at the onset to fulfil a more nationalist foreign policy for Indonesia, one that enhances Indonesia’s position on the global stage. The first step to this was the appointment of his close ally, Sugiano, as Foreign Minister. Sugiano, lacking any formal diplomatic experience, was deemed by many as a “rubber stamp”, allowing Prabowo a more dominant position in foreign affairs. This nationalist position (albeit in Prabowo’s own terms) aligns with Prabowo’s own past anti-Western rhetoric. While he has toned this down since assuming the presidency, this anti-West position comes out in several instances, such as Indonesia’s refusal to sign the June 2024 Ukraine Peace Summit final communique (Indonesia argued it an advocated a position aligned with that of the West despite voting in favor of previous UNGA resolutions), his open positioning of Indonesia as major leader in the Muslim world during speeches on the Gaza issue, and Indonesia joining the BRICS in 2024. However, when faced with an initial 32% tariff from the US (with the threat of an additional 10% for BRICS members), Indonesia Prabowo was willing to forgo this anti-Western position and grant concessions to the US to lower the tariff to 19%. At the same time, while criticizing the EU’s trading practices at the WTO, Prabowo’s administration also signed the Indonesia-EU Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. All of these have contributed to the view that Indonesia’s tendency to flip-flop is an indication that the country’s foreign policy lacks a clear direction.

It is, however, in the regional front that Indonesia has seen the most criticism. The weakness of Indonesia’s foreign affairs establishment at the moment is quite evident in how this personalization has affected how Indonesia has dealt with key regional issues. These include: 1) The South China Sea dispute; 2) The Myanmar Crisis; and 3) the Thailand-Cambodia conflict. Indonesia’s joint statement with the PRC on maritime cooperation was widely criticized for going against the position of ASEAN states and of Indonesia itself, with Prabowo allegedly ignoring the advice from senior Indonesian diplomats. Sugiano was also notably absent in several high-level ASEAN meetings, including the thorny issue of the conflict in Myanmar, where Indonesia’s “quiet diplomacy approach” was seen as ineffectual during its ASEAN chairmanship. ASEAN mediation efforts led by Indonesia on the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict also proved futile, leading to renewed hostilities in 2025 and necessitating intervention by external powers. All the while, Indonesia seems to be more engaged in conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.

The net effect of this confusion and shifts is that overall, Indonesia at this point looks a lot less of a regional leader than it did before, leading to questions about the place of ASEAN and regional concerns in Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of IIPA and this platform.

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Author

Juhn Chris Espia is a non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs and Associate Professor at the University of the Division of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines Visayas.

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